Scheduling of Service Interruptions at WLCG Sites

Executive Summary
This document describes the procedure for scheduling and announcing service interruptions at WLCG Tier0 and Tier1 sites.

All interruptions that do not follow this procedure shall be deemed to be unscheduled and shall be thus accounted in the corresponding Site Availability reports.

To avoid changes to the numbering below, any corrections, additions or other updates will be made at the end of the document and indicated as shown below.

The service levels and intervention times are based on those in the WLCG Memorandum of Understanding [1].

0. Sample correction.

Accelerator Operation

1. Scheduled service interventions shall normally be performed outside of the announced period of operation of the LHC accelerator.

2. In the event of mandatory interventions during the operation period of the accelerator – such as a non-critical security patch¹ – an announcement will be made using the Communication Interface for Central (CIC) operations portal and the period of scheduled downtime entered in the Grid Operations Centre (GOC) database (GOCDB).

3. Such an announcement shall be made at least one working day in advance for interventions of up to 4 hours.

4. Interventions resulting in significant service interruption or degradation longer than 4 hours and up to 12 hours shall be announced at the Weekly Operations meeting prior to the intervention, with a reminder sent via the CIC portal as above.

5. Interventions exceeding 12 hours must be announced at least one week in advance, following the procedure above.

6. A further announcement shall be made once normal service has been resumed.

7.¹ In September 2004, the Desktop Forum at CERN endorsed a proposal whereby critical security alerts were acted upon immediately – taking precedence even over accelerator operation. This applied to alerts of the highest level, defined as follows: “The vulnerability is high risk and requires little specialized knowledge to exploit. Apply the patch and/or workaround to the affected products with the highest priority.” The context was that of Oracle security alerts, but we propose that it be broadened to cover all critical components, including operating systems and grid middleware. These interventions should at minimum be announced using the CIC portal as described above.
Intervention planning should also anticipate any interruptions to jobs running in the site batch queues. If appropriate the queues should be drained and the queues closed for further job submission.

## Corrections and Updates

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Heading</th>
<th>Details</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>00/00/00</td>
<td>Executive Summary</td>
<td>Dummy text.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16/05/06</td>
<td>Point 7 deleted</td>
<td>As agreed at MB.</td>
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<tr>
<td>16/06/06</td>
<td>New point on draining batch queues added.</td>
<td>Text from Nick Brook</td>
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